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Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 7267 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is taken ·from the Decree of the Honorable 
Marriner M. Morrison, former judge of the District Court 
of the First Judicial District in and for Cache County, State 
of Utah, whereby and wherein on the 17th day of August, 
1948, he entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and 
against the defendant thereby imposing a trust on a Warranty 
Deed which was absolute and unconditional on its face. (Ex· 
hibit "A," TR. 2, 4, 5, 26-30). 
This was a suit in equity and the appeal is upon both the 
law and facts. 
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PLEADINGS 
That part of the complaint pertinent to the discussion 
herein is. as follows: 
That on or about the 18th day of August, 1927, .Maria 
Anderson Haws executed a Warranty Deed to one Amber 
Haws for and in consideration of $1.00, love and affection, 
conveying the property in question. That Maria Anderson 
Haws died on the 24th day of March, 1939, leaving as her 
heirs at law the plaintiffs and Amber Haws, the grantee. At 
her direction the deed was recorded in the office of County 
Recorder, Cache County, Utah, on the 2nd day of December, 
1933. That prior to and at the time of execution of the deed 
and following its execution and at the time of its recording 
and delivery the grantor intended that the grantee would take 
the s~id property as trustee for the use and benefit of the 
grantor and all of her children and the grandchildren of one 
of her deceased sons. That the conveyance of the property, 
while in the form of a warranty deed, was to create an oral 
trust. That the terms of said trust provided that the trustee 
should hold and maintain said property as a family home to 
be used by the grantor and/ or her children or the children of 
the said children then living for so long as any of the said 
persons should need a home with complete discretion in the 
trustee as to which of said persons should use said property. 
That the beneficiaries under said trust were the plaintiffs herein. 
That the grantee knew of the terms of said trust and the inten-
tion of the grantor in executing said deed and that shortly after 
is execution and delivery the grantee accepted the trust and 
,proceeded to perform and carry out the terms thereof in ~ I 
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accordance with the spirit, desire and intention of the grantor; 
that she carried out the terms of the said trust until her death. 
That the grantee during the month of April, 1939, 
married the defendant herein and was known thereafter as 
Amber Haws Jensen, that on the 16th day of March, 1945 
she died; that at the time of the defendant's marriage with 
the grante_e and at all times thereafter he knew of the existence 
of the trust and that he had recognized the existence of said 
trust at diverse times and upon diverse occasions, and that 
as a fraud_ upon the plaintiffs and with full knowledge of the 
existence of said trust now refuses to permit any of the plaintiffs 
to enter upon said property and that he refuses to recognize 
the vaJidity . of the trust and claims said property hy right of 
succession, free and clear of said trust and all of the equities 
of the plaintiffs herein. 
That the property in question was distributed to the 
defendant as the sole heir at law of Amber Haws Jensen, the 
grantee, on the 13th day of February, 1947. (TR. 3-6). 
DEMURRER 
To the complaint, the defendant filed a general demurrer 
on the grounds that the complaint did not state sufficient 
facts to constitute a cause of action and that said action was 
barred by Chapter 5 of U.A.C. 1943, Section 33-5-1 and ,other 
sections_ applicable thereto. , . (TR. 7). The demurrer was 
argued and subsequently overruled by the court. (TR. 7, 35). 
AMENDED ANSWER 
Defendant admitted the execution and delivery of the 
deed by its recording, the death of both . the grantor and 
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grantee, admitted the marriage of grantee and defendant 
and that the defendant was the surviving heir of the grantee, 
and that the plaintiffs were the heirs of the grantor. He 
denied each and every other allegation of the complaint. By 
way of a further and separate answer, he alleged that the 
grantee paid a fair and reasonable consideration for the prop-
erty and that the deed was delivered to the grantee absolutely 
and without condition. By way of a further answer he alleged 
that the action was barred by 33-5-1 and 35-5-3, U.C.A. 1943. 
By way of further defense he also alleged that the action 
was barred by 104-2-24, U.C.A. 1943. (TR. 12, 13). 
Upon the issues thus drawn the cause was heard by the 
court sitting without a jury. 
At the beginning of the trial the defendant objected to 
the introduction of any oral testimony for the purpose of 
i.mposing the trust on the property for the reason that the 
plaintiffs had pleaded an express trust and that such is con-
trary to the statute of frauds. He made the further objection 
that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action. The 
objection was overruled: (TR. 49). 
FURTHER STATEMENTS OF FACT 
On the 18th day of August, 1927, the grantor, a widow, 
executed to her daughter Amber Haws as grantee, a warranty 
deed conveying the property in question. The deed was 
abs9lute and unconditional on its face without any reservations 
whatsoever. The grantor retained possession of it until the 
2nd day of August, 1933, when she caused it to be recorded 
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by Lucinda Haws Ballam, one of the plaintiffs, in the recorder's 
office, Cache County, Utah. (Exhibit "A" TR. 149, 150). 
At the date of the commencement of this action, on the 
19th day of March, 1947, both the grantor and grantee were 
dead, the grantor having died on the 24th of March, 1939, 
and the grantee on the 16th of March, 1945. The action was 
also started two years after the grantee's death and just .five 
days short of nine years of the grantor's death, also nearly 
20 years after execution of the deed and 14 years after its 
delivery. (TR. 3-6). 
In 1919 the grantee left Utah, making her home in 
California where she resided until 193 7, all the while being 
gainfully employed and making from 63 cents to $1.25 per 
hour. She quit her employment and returned to Hyrum, Utah, 
to take care of her mother who was sick, which she did until 
her mother's death two years later. (TR. 60-62, 167-168, 
197-198, Exhibit "5"). 
The grantee was the oldest in the family and assisted 
her mother since she began working in 1917 until the latter's 
death in 1939. She remained unmarried until her mother's 
death when she married the defendant April 8, 1939 at the 
ageof47years. (TR. 114,180, 204). 
In fact, she not only helped her mother .financially over 
the years but she paid the expenses of her mother's last illness, 
including her doctor's bill and funeral expenses except the sum 
of $75.00 which was furnished by the State Welfare Depart-
ment. On April 5, 1939, she paid $100.00 on account to the 
Thompson Funeral Home; April 8, 1939, she paid $8.00 for 
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cement work and the digging of the grave; on May 12, she 
paid $75.00 furnished by the Welfare Department arid $50.00 ·;; 
of her own ·money. (TR. 161, 167, 168, 171, l99, 201 and 
Exhibit "6"). 
That Amber Haws, the grantee, was of financial assist-
ance to her mother and family and had been for over a number 
of years is further indicated by the fact that she paid the funeral 
expenses of Noble Haws, a brother, the father of two of the 
plaintiffs, in 1941. (TR. 202, Exhibit "7"). 
Mrs. Haws, the grantor, told several people that she was J 
going to and later that she had deeded the property to her 
daughter, Amber, or as they put it, "gave it to her," because 
of the grantee's goodness and financial assistance to her. 
In accordance with this a nephew, C. H. Lewis, declared, 
"Well, the only conversation I had with her was that she had 
given it to Amber because Amber had done so much for her, 
that she had sent her money when she was in California and 
had come home and taken care of her and that she had given 
the property to Amber." (TR. 161, 162). 
She also made practically the same statement to a niece, 
the wife of C. H. Lewis, on more than one occasion. (TR. 
167,· 168}. 
A neighbor, Raymond Nielsen, reported, "Yes, she just 
said that Amber was going to get the place." (TR. 165). 
In line with these declarations the grantor deeded the 
property to the grantee, and the grantee upon her mother's 
death on March 24, 1939, went into exclusive possession of 
:Jnt 
:!t 
-Kia 
~it ,, 
The 
~'or 
:ram. 
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the property. in question. Upon her marriage to the defendant 
it beca~e their home and they held it out to the world as 
such and they lived in it together until her death, March 16, 
1945. a period of nearly seven years, paying the taxes. During 
that period the grantee not only held ou.t to the world and to 
the plaintiffs herein that the property was hers and the home 
of her and her husband, the defendant, but in keeping. with 
such declarations she and the defendant improved the property. 
They straightened out and moved back a corral, leveled th~ 
lot north of the house, pulled trees out on the southeast side 
of the house, planted an orchard of trees on the southeast 
corner of the lot• south of the barn, planted some berries, 
shingled the shanty, put a roof over the cellar and a cement 
floor in it, had the inside walls stuccoed, built a building in 
front of the cellar for an entrance and planted some hay. This 
was done during the years 1940 and 1941. (TR. 63, ~4, 173, 
1'74, 183, 185, 210, 212, 216). 
In 1935 the property was conveyed to Cache County, 
Utah under a tax deed because of failure to pay the taxes 
assessed thereon. Pursuant to which the grantor wrote the 
grantee telling her that the property was being sold for taxes 
and if she didn't send her $100.00 to pay them it would be 
sold. The grantee sent up $100.00 to pay taxes, upon payment 
of which Cache County conveyed property back to the grantee 
by quitclaim deed on the 29th of May, 1936. (TR. 182, 183, 
Exhibit "2", Entry 16). 
The transaction with the county was handled by Garland 
Haws, one of the plaintiffs, and although he admitted handling 
the transaction and paying to Cache County the $100.00 he 
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did not remember from whom it came. He did not deny that 
it came from Amber Haws, the grantee. (TR. 253). 
A few weeks before Amber Haws Jensen's death, she ~; 
and the defendant made a trip to California where they visited 
with Mrs. Rose and Mrs. Ballam, two of the plaintiffs, and 
about the time and the grantee and her husband were leaving 
California to return to Utah, they asked why she didn't sell 
her home in Hyrum, Utah, and move to California, buying 
a home there. (TR. 190, 191). 
The defendant and Amber, his wife, the grantee lived on 
the property from the date of their marriage, April 8, 1939, :J 
until her death on March 16, 1945, during which time none ~..: 
of the plaintiffs nor any other person claimed any interest in ;:t 
the property. All of them knew that they were living there :r 
and had taken exclusive possession. Mrs. BaHam, one of the 
plaintiffs, and her husband visited them in 1940 and 1941. 
(TR. 63, 125, 126, 135, 185). 
_, 
As noted before, the grantee resided in California from j 
1919 until 1937 when she returned home to take care of her 
mother, the grantor, and thus she was a resident of that state 
at both the time of the execution of the deed and delivery of 
~~ 
the deed. The deed was recorded at the instance of the mother, 
not by the grantee but by one of the plaintiffs. (TR. 112, 113, 
150). 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the grantee ever 
had any knowledge that her mother intended to or had conveyed 
the property to her until after delivery of the deed, that she 
ever induced her mother by action or suggestion to deed the 
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property to her, or that she ever made any promise to her 
mother whatsoever as a condition to her receiving the property. 
There is no evidence that she knew or was advised by her 
mother or anyone else that the property was to be taken 
subject to any condition whatsoever. (TR. 50, 51, 55, 60, 
66, 73, 76, 81, 91, 93, 96, 97, 108, 114, 115, 117, 130, 142, 
149, 150, 151, 152, 156, 159, 161, 162, 164, 165, 167, 168, 
181, 182, 183, 184, 190, 193, 194). 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
1. The Court erred in overruling the defendant's general 
demurrer to plaintiff's complaint, for by the demurrer the 
defendant raised the Statute of Fraud and the complaint on 
its face showed that plaintiffs were declaring on an express 
and not upon a constructive trust. 
2. The Court erred in overruling the defendant's objec-
tion to the introduction of any parol evidence for the reason 
that the plaintiffs complaint showed on its face that they had 
declared on an express trust and that it was within the Statute 
of Frauds. 
Before the introduction of any parol evidence, the 
defendant made the following objection: 
"Mr. L .D. Daines: Just a minute. At this time we 
object to the introduction of any parol testimony for 
the purpose of attempting to alter this deed or i~po~e 
a trust on this property, for the reason that the plamtlff 
in this case has now pleaded an express trust and such 
other testimony is contrary to the Statute of Frauds. 
We make further objection on the grounds that they 
failed to plead a cause of action. 
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The Court: You may answer. The objection is over-
ruled. 
Mr. Daines: If the Court please, may we have a ruling 
that it goes to all the testimony? 
The Court: Yes, the record may show that the objec-
tion will go to all the testimony along this line." (Tr. 
49). 
There was no documentary evidence introduced whatso-
ever, signed either by the grantor or the grantee which by its 
terms created a trust. 
3. That the Court erred in admitting the following testi-
-mony of the plaintiff's witness, A. A. Savage, to which the de-
fendant duly objected . 
.. By Mr. Bell. 
Q. I ask you whether or not you have had any conver-
sation with Maria Haws concerning this property? 
A. I did on one occasion. 
Q. And when was that occasion? 
A. It was in the month of February, 1935 * * * 
Q. And where did the conversation take place? 
A. In her home. 
Q. And who was present at the time? 
A. Well, I couldn't tell you whether there was anyone 
else other than her, I couldn't. I can't remember that. 
* * * 
Q. Will you give us the nature of that conversation? 
Mr. L. D. Daines: We object at this time to any testi-
mony on the grounds that this conversation is after 
the delivery of the deed. 
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The Court: You may answer * * * 
Q. Continue on with the conversation. 
A. I asked her if we should send this-this attached 
notice sent to Amber, and she says "No, send it here." 
Says 'I transferred the property to Amber, thought she 
might gest take care of it in dividing it up when I die." 
(Tr. 72-73). 
The deed was delivered August 2, 1933 (Tr. 4). 
4. That the Court erred in admitting the following testi-
mony of the witness Nora Neilsen, to which the defendant 
duly objected. 
By Mr. Young: 
Q. Did you discuss or have any conversation with Mrs. 
Haws during her lifetime with respect to the matter 
of her property? 
A. Y~s, sir. 
Q. Can you tell us when the last conversation took 
place that you recall ? Could you fix some definite 
time? 
A. Well, I couldn't give you a definite time. But I 
could give you probably the year * * * It was probably 
in 1935. * * * 
Mr. L. D. Daines: We object at this time on the 
grounds the evidence shows the conversation was sub-
sequent to the execution of the deed. * * * 
Q. What I wanted to inquire about was that last con-
versation you recall having with her or hearing her 
talk about her property. 
A. Well, that took place at my own home right on the 
porch. We were sitting on the porch and she told me-. 
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Q. Just a minute before that. Do you recall when that 
was? 
A. Well, I think it was about 1935 * * * 
Q. Allright, now what did she say? 
A. Well she says: "Vera," she says, "I am going tc 
fix my property so that Amber will take care of it. 
And when I pass away I want her to keep the old home 
for the children that they will have a gathering place 
to come," and she says, "I know that Amber will do 
that because she is fair and just." And by the way, 
at that time she was the only single member of the 
family." (Tr. 88-91). 
This witness has changed her testimony to "She had fixed 
the deed." 
The deed was delivered August 2, 1933 (Tr. 4). 
5. That the Court erred in admitting the following testi-
mony of the witness Hermoine Rose, one of the plaintiffs, to 
which the defendant duly objected: 
By Mr. Bell: 
Q. I will ask you if you ever had any conversation 
between Amber and any members of your family re-
garding this property. 
A. Yes, we had-. 
Mr. L. D. Daines: Just a minute-. 
The Court: Same objection; same ruling." 
The defendant objected to the witness's husband, Law-
rence Rose, testifying for the reason: 
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:Mr. L. D. Daines. ~' e object on the grounds thal 
it is incompetent for this man to testify under the Dead 
~fen's Statute." 
The objection of counsel as the record reflects was to have 
been the . same objection as imposed to the testimony of the 
husband of the witness to testify. 
By lv!r. Bell: 
Q. Will you state the nature of the conversation that 
took place at that time? 
A. Well, Amber was very sick at the time and my sister 
· Mrs. Ballam, and her husband and my daughter-in-
law, Arlene Rose and Mr. Jensen was there and she was 
crying. It was just a day or two before they had to 
leave to return to Hyrum or for Utah and she said 
they hoped to come back, and my sister asked her why 
she didn't sell th_e old place. We would give her per-
mission, and there would be-and it would be allright 
with us. She could sell it and come down there so we 
could all be together and she said, "No, she would not 
sell the home." Mother's wish was that it remained 
the way it was so there would be a home for someone. 
At that time Mr. Jensen said they did not care to sell, 
and she told him it was not any of his affair." (Tr. 
130, 140-142). 
6. The Court erred in admitting the following testimony 
of the witness, Lucinda H. Ballam, one of the plaintiffs: 
By Mr. Young: . 
Now, Your Honor, this witness, of course, is a daugh-
ter of the decedent, Maria, and a sister of the decedent, 
Amber Haws-and we also offer to prove the conver-
sation between this witness and her sister, the grantee 
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in the deed, as to the conversation between them. Now 
I suppose it raises the question as to whether or not 
the evidence is admissible under the so-called Dead 
Men's Statute. * * * 
The Court: You may put on her testimony subject to 
their objection. 
Q. Now, did you ever have any talk with your sister 
Amber. about the matter ? 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. When did you talk to her? 
A. Well, we talked of it in my home in California; 
she said that- * * * 
Q. What did Amber say? 
A. She said the place was her home. We should 
all feel free to come home any time we wanted to, that 
it was ours as much as hers, and any of our children 
would be welcome there. When we got through with 
it, if she ever sold it, why, the intention was that we 
should have our share--. 
Q. Were you present at the home of your sister, .Mrs. 
Rose, one time when Mr. Jensen and your sister 
Amber was there? 
A. Yes, I was * * * 
Q. Allright. Now, what was the substance of that con-
versation, in Mr. Jensen's presence? 
A. Only that Mrs. Rose here--we were all talking 
· here. We were sitting in the front room and Mr. and 
Mrs. Rose and Mr. Jensen and Amber and I were 
there, and she was not feeling a bit well and she was 
crying. She said she hated to go back to Hyrum. "Why 
don't you sell out and come back here and have a 
home? We would like to be together." We had been 
separated so much. She said, "I will never sell the 
place because mother wanted it for all the children 
and that's the way it's going to stay." At that time 
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Mr. Jensen said something about wanting to sell it 
and she said, "You keep still. This is nothing to do 
with you. You won't get anything out of it." (Tr. 
146-148, 150-152). 
7. That the Court erred in finding that prior to and at 
the time of the execution of the deed, and at the time of 
recording and delivery thereof, the grantor, Maria Anderson 
Haws, intended that the grantee thereof, the said Amber 
Haws Jensen, would take and hold said property as trustee 
for the use and benefit of the heirs of Maria Anderson Haws. 
That Amber Haws Jensen paid no consideration whereof for 
the said property, that the said Amber Haws Jensen accepted 
said deed in accordance with the terms and provisions of said 
trust, if any, and thereby agreed to take legal title to said 
property . as trustee for the use and benefit of the said heirs 
at law of the said Maria Anderson Haws upon her death for 
the reason: 
(a) That it is contrary to the Statute of Frauds and based 
on parol testimony; and/or that there is no evidence to support 
. the finding; and/or that it is against the weight and perponder-
ance of the testimony; and/or that the plaintiff failed to prove 
that the deed was delivered to the grantee unconditionally and 
without reservations by evidence which clearly, definitely, un-
equivocably and conclusively proved that the deed in question 
1 was taken conditionally and subject to a trust, if any. 
(b) That said finding is indefinite in that it cannot be 
ascertained therefrom, together with other findings in the 
record, what were the terms of the trust, if any. That there 
are no facts found therein which would establish a trust. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
8. That the Court erred in finding that the conveyance 
of the property to the grantee while in the form of a Warranty 
Deed was a trust, and that the grantor executed said deed for 
the purpose of avoiding probate proceedings and that Maria 
Anderson Haws intended to create a trust for the heirs while 
living and after her death for the use and benefit of the heirs 
at law of Maria Anderson Haws, for the reason that it is within 
the Statute of Frauds based on parol testimony; and/or that 
there is no evidence to sustain the finding; and/ or that it is 
contrary to the weight and preponderance of the testimony; 
and/or that it is not based upon clear, definite, unequivocable 
and conclusive proof; and/ or that it is so indefinite that it 
cannot be ascertained what were the elements of trust, if any. 
9. That the Court erred in finding that John P. Jensen, 
the defendant, received legal title to the property as trustee, 
subject to the terms of the trust, if any, created by Maria 
Anderson Haws, for the reason that it is within the Statute 
of Frauds based on parol testimony; and/or that it is contrary 
to the weight and preponderance of the testimony; and/or 
that such trust, if any, was not established by clear, definite, 
unequivocable and conclusive proof. 
10. That the Court erred in finding that the defendant 
as a fraud upon the plaintiffs in full knowledge of the accept-
ance of the trust, if any, refused· to recognize the validity of the 
trust, if any, and claimed said property by right of succession, 
free and clear of said trust, if any, and equities of said trust, 
if any, for the reason that it is within the Statute of Frauds 
based on parol testimony; and/or that there is no evidence to 
'I 
:,N 
'! 
:ti 
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sustain the finding; and/or that It IS contrary to the weight 
and preponderance of the testimony; and/ or that it is not based 
upon clear, definite and unequivocable and conclusive proof. 
11. That the Court erred in making and entering its Con-
clusions of Law that Amber Haws Jensen took the property in 
trust and not as an absolute conveyance, and that at the time 
of her death she held said property in trust for the use 
and benefit of the heirs at law of Maria Anderson Haws, and 
that the beneficial title to the property is veste~ in the heirs 
at law of .Niaria Anderson Haws, and that the plaintiffs are 
entitled to have a trustee appointed to succeed said Amber 
Haws .Jensen and the said John P. Jensen as trustee of said 
property, and that the said John P. Jensen should convey his 
legal title to said successor trustees, for the reason that the 
findings of fact do not support the conclusion of law andjor 
there is no evidence to sustain the findings; andjor that the 
findings are against the weight and preponderance of the 
testimony; and/or that the plaintiffs failed to establish by 
clear, definite, unequivocable and conclusive proof any trust 
whatsoever; and/or that such trust, if any, was within the 
Statute of Frauds; and/or that the said findings are indefinite 
and ambiguous in that they have failed to describe the terms 
of the said trust, if any; and/or that if the terms of said trust, 
if any, are definitely established, that the said John P. Jensen 
is the sole heir at law of Maria Anderson Haws and is 
entitled to one-sixth interest in said property. 
12. That the Court erred in entering its order and decree 
wherein it ordered and adjudged that Amber Haws Jensen 
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held the property in question in trust until her death on March 
16, 1945, for the use and benefit of the heirs at law of Maria 
Anderson Haws, and that John P. Jensen received legal title 
to said property as said trustee, subject to the terms of the 
trust, if any, created by Maria Anderson Haws, and that the 
defendant John P. Jensen as a fraud upon the plaintiffs in 
full knowledge of the acceptance of said trust, if any, now 
refuses to recognize the validity of the trust, if any, and 
claims that said property by the right of succession free and 
clear of said trust, and all of the equities therein, and that 
it is necessary that a successor trustee to the defendant be 
appointed, and in appointing Vera Haws as trustee of the 
property in question, for the use and benefit of the heirs of 
Maria Anderson Haws and in ordering that the defendant quit 
claim of all of his right, title and interest in said property to 
the trustee, for the reason that the findings of fact and con-
clusions do not sustain the decree that there is no evidence 
.:::.f 
,iJ( 
to sustain the findings; andjor that the findings are against ·')t 
the weight and preponderance of the testimony; and/or that ~r 
the plaintiffs failed to establish by clear, definite, unequivocable 
and conclusive proof any trust whatsover; and/or that such 
trust, if any, was within the Statute of Frauds; and/or that 
the said findings are indefinite and ambiguous in that they 
have failed to describe the terms of the said trust, if any; 
and/or that if the terms of said trust, if any, are definitely 
established and supported by the evidence that the said John 
J. Jensen is the sole heir at law of Amber Haws Jensen and 
is entitled to a one-sixth interest in said property. 
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13. That the Court erred in failing to find that··the prop-
erty was deeded to the grantee by the grantor unconditionally 
and without any reservations whatsoever and in failing to 
enter its judgment and decree in favor of the defendant and 
against the plaintiff, decreeing that the defendant received 
the property in question free and clear of .all claims and 
demands of the plaintiffs, for the reason that the grantee 
received the ·conveyance unconditionally and not subject to 
any trust; and/or that if there is any trust it is within the 
Statute of Frauds; and/or that there is no evidence to establish 
that the deed was conveyed conditionally and subject to a 
trust; andjor that no trust was established by the weight and 
preponderance of the testimony; and/or that no trust was 
established by clear, definite, unequivocable and conclusive 
proof. 
14. If there was a trust the court, nevertheless, erred in 
failing to find the defendant, as the sole heir at law of Amber 
Haws Jensen, the grantee, was entitled to a one-sixth interest 
in the property in ·question. 
15. That the Court erred in failing to find that plaintiffs' 
cause of action, if any, was barred by sub-paragraph 3 of 104-
2-24, U.C.A. 1943,-the Statute of Limitations, for the reason 
that if a trust, if any, was established, it was repudiated by 
the grantee more than three years preceding the commence:. 
ment of this action, and that the plaintiffs had notice of such 
repudiation. 
16. That the Court erred in failing to find that plaintiffs' 
cause of action, if any, was within the Statute of Frauds, and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
. 22 
unenforceable, for the reason that if a trust, if any, it was 
established by parol evidence and that the plaintiffs were 
declaring upon an express trust. 
ARGUMENT 
It is the contention of the defendant that the court's decree 
imposing a constructive trust is contrary to the law and evidence . ,::1( 
for the following reasons: 
1. That the court erred in overruling defendant's general 
demurrer to plaintiffs' complaint for the demurrer raised the 
question of the Statute of Frauds and plaintiffs' complaint on its 
face showed that they were declaring on an express oral trust 
and not upon a constructive trust, and that the plaintiffs' cause 
of action was within the Statute of Frauds. 
2. That the court erred in overruling defendant's objection 
':.01 
to the introduction of any parol evidence for the reason that 
plaintiffs' complaint on its face showing that they were declar· iiftl 
ing on an express trust and that it was within the Statute of 
Frauds. ..::t1 
3. That the court erred in admitting plaintiffs' witnesses 
to testify as to self-serving declarations of the grantor not in 
the presence of the grantee and made after the delivery of 
the deed in disparagement of the title conveyed. 
4. That the court erred in permitting two of the plaintiffs 
to testify over defendant's objection as to conversation with 
the deceased grantee regarding the transaction in dispute. 
n 
J'~ 
.Ill 
i\1 
~] 
'11 
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5. That there is no evidence to sustain the court's findings 
of fact that the grantee took the property subject to any con-. 
ditions for the use and benefit of the grantor's heirs, and that 
in any event the conveyance is within the Statute of Frauds 
and void. 
6. It is defendant's further position that the plaintiffs 
failed to prove by preponderance of the evidence and by clear, 
certain, definite, unequivocal and conclusive proof that the 
grantee took the deed subject to any conditions whatsoever. 
7. That in the event there was a trust created the court, 
nevertheless, erred in directing the defendant to convey all 
of his right, title and interest in the property to a trustee for 
the reason that as sole heir of the grantee he was entitled to 
whatever interest she had in the property, or one-six interest. 
8. That in any event the plaintiffs' cause of action if any 
is barred by the Statute of Limitations, sub-section 3, 104-2-24 
U.C.A. 1943 for the reason that if a trust existed it was re-
pudiated by grantee more than three ·years prior to the com-
mencement of this action. 
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFEND-
ANT'S GENERAL DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS' COM-
PLAINT AS THE COMPLAINT ON ITS FACE SHOWED 
THAT PLAINTIFFS HAD DECLARED ON AN EXPRESS 
ORAL TRUST AND THAT IT WAS WITHIN THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
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To plaintiffs' complaint defendant filed a general de. 
murrer, alleging that it did not state a cause of action, and 
that it was barred by .33-1-5 U.C.A: and other section ap-
plicable thereto statute of frauds. The demurrer was argued 
and overruled. (TR. 7, 35). At the beginning of the trial 
the defendant further objected to the introduction of any 
oral testimony stating the reason that plaintiff had pleaded 
an express trust, that such was contrary to the Statute of 
frauds, and that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of 
action. The objection was overruled. (TR. 49). 
The complaint recited that they were declaring on an oral 
trust, stating, ''That the conveyance of said property to the 
said Amber Haws Jensen while in the form of a warranty 
deed was intended to create an o1'al trust'' (TR. 4) and having 
pleaded an express oral trust they failed to set forth any facts 
whatsoever that would take it out of the statute of frauds. 
No constructive trust was alleged. There are no allegations 
of confiqential relationship, fraud, misrepresentation, or any 
other matter that would establish a constructive trust. (TR. 
3, 6). 
The statute of frauds may be raised by demurrer, where 
it appears on the face of the complaint, that the plaintiff is 
declaring or an express oral trust. 
The Supreme Court of California in the case of Barr v. 
O'Donnell 18 P. 429 said: 
"If land be conveyed by an absolute deed, no express 
trust in favor of the grantor can be raised by proof of 
a parol agreement by the grantee to hold the property 
:::re 
~J 
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in trust or convey it. * * * And if it appears on the 
face of the complaint that the alleged trust rests in 
a parol agreement to reconvey, the defense of statute 
of frauds may be taken advantage of on demurrer." 
To the same effect see: 1Iick v. Butler 256 P. 159; Moyni-
han v. Murphy 1--!8 N. E. 380; Oglesby v. Wilmerding, Morris 
& Mitchell 99 S. E. 29; Wright v. Young 176 P 583; Howard 
'"· Foskett- 189 P. 396; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees Vol. 1. 
Sec. 71. 280. 
And Bogert, in his work on Trusts and Trustees, Vol. 1 
Sec. 70 p. 276 sets forth that either the trustee or his successor 
in interest or title can take advantage of the Statute of Frauds. 
He said: 
The seventh section of frauds was enacted to prevent 
trust obligations being fastened upon parties through 
parol testimony which is subject to the danger of 
fraud, perjury and mistake. It would seem, therefore, 
that only those who will escape obligations and duties 
by means of setting up the statute should be allowed 
to take this advantage. The trustee obviously comes 
under onerous duties by means of a trust. He of all 
persons ought to be allowed the protection of the 
statute, so that his title to realty, which appears on the 
face of it to be absolute, shall not be encumbered and 
burdened by a doubtful trust, and he himself shall not 
lightly be placed in a fiduciary position requiring ex-
treme good faith and much diligence. The trustee and 
his successors in title to the trust property by way of 
intestacy, transfer by will, or transfer inter-vivos, are 
allowed to plead the statute of frauds and defeat the 
enforcement of the oral trust." 
The court had befort it 33-5-1 U.C.A., 1943, which reads: 
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No estate or interest in real property, other than leases 
for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or 
power over or concerning real property or in any man-
ner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or 
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful 
agen.t thereunto authorized by writing." 
Also sec. 33-5-3 U.C.A. 1943 which reads as follows: 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than 
one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest 
in lands, shall be void. unless the contract, or some note 
or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by 
the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or 
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
As previously pointed out, the plaintiffs are declaring 
on an express oral trust, and they pleaded no facts that would 
· take the oral trust out of the statute of frauds. A constructive 
trust was not alleged. They did not allege any fraud, mis-
representation, breach of a confidential relationship, or any 
other elements necessary to create a constructive trust. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in the case of Mick v. 
Butler, 158 P. 256, supra, held that defendant's demurrer to 
plaintiff's complaint was good for the reason that the complaint 
on its face showed that it was an express oral trust and within 
the statute of fraud. The plaintiff alleged that both she 
and the defendant were members of the same church, of 
which the defendant was a leading member, that she orally 
agreed with him that she would turn over to him a certain 
:til 
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lot for the benefit of the church on the condition that if the 
building ceased to be used for church purposes that it would 
revert to her. That the defendant orally accepted the trust 
and with it the sales contract which she had of the property 
and that on June, 1921, she gave the defendant seventy-five 
dollars with which to make final payment on the property; 
that he converted the property to his own use. In sustaining 
the general demurrer, the court said: 
" * * * The pleading sets up an express trust created 
by oral contract. The fiduciary relations arise by reason 
of this express oral contract, and the fiduciary character 
of the transaction is alleged to have been created by 
the very contract upon which the cause of action is 
based. It is not a case of fiduciary relations already 
existing and a trust created by law or a resulting trust. 
It sets up an express trust created by oral contract, and 
this is squarely interdicted by our statute. Therefore 
the court believes that the statement of such a trust is 
not the statement of a legal obligation, and that there-
fore the demurrer is well taken on that ground." 
In the Massachusetts case of Moynihan v. Murphy 148 
N. E. 380, supra, the plaintiff alleged that the grantor conveyed 
property to her daughter, the grantee, upon her agreement to 
hold it for herself and sisters, keep it in repair, pay the liens 
thereon, and provide a home for the mother during her life-
time. That the plaintiff remained in possession after the 
grantee's marriage to the defendant, supported the mother, 
and paid the taxes thereon. The husband of the deceased 
grantee and administrator of her estate raised the statute of 
fraud by demurrer. The Court, sustaining the demurrer, said: 
"No trust can be created by oral statements or agree-
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ments by either Margaret or Annie T. Moynihan * * * 
Nor do the facts alleged support a constructive trust. 
No fraud was practiced on Margaret Moynihan. Annie 
T. Moynihan made no representation and no promises 
to any of the plaintiffs so far as the bill shows." 
In the Georgia case of Oglesby v. Wilmerding, Morris 
& Mitchell 99 S. E. 29 plaintiffs alleged that George B. 
Lumpkin, father of T. B. Lumpkin, died, leaving a widow, 
four children and tract of land. They sold the land, paid the 
debts, and has $4000 remaining. They agreed that the $4000 
should be held in trust by T. B. Lumpkin, charged with the 
duty of paying to Mrs. Lucy .A. Lumpkin, the interest on the 
same at 8lfo during her lifetime, and on her death, the $4000 
was to be divided equally among the four children; that T. 
B. Lumpkin did take the $4000 under these terms and con-
ditions, and paid Mrs. Lucy A. Lumpkin the interest on the 
same up to the time of her death which occurred March 21, 
1909 and paid certain small sums to petitioner, reducing her 
debt to $963. The Court said: 
"We are of the opinion that the Court properly sus-
tained the general demurrer to that part of the petition 
which seeks to have the debt due the petitioner given 
a priority as a trust. If the verbal agreement under 
which T. B. Lumpkin took charge of the fund of $4000 
created a trust, it was an express trust, and under the 
provisions of our law, all express trusts must be created 
in WRITING." 
In the Oregon case of Howard V. Foskett, 189 P. 396, 
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's husband conveyed 
the property to her upon her verbal agreement that if she 
:ttl 
:t! 
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survived him that she would convey the property to the 
plaintiffs reserving in herself a life estate that in reliance of 
said verbal promises to said Alice S. Foskett and believing same 
to be true and in consideration thereof her husband consented 
to the execution of the deeds. That the Court said: 
"The rule is universal that a parol declaration of a 
trust will not affect the land, and for this reason parol 
evidence is inadmissible to establish such a trust. In 
Fairchild vs. Rasdall, 9 Wis. 3 79, the court, speakin'g 
of the universality of this rule, say: 'We do not feel 
called upon to cite authorities to show that, in the 
·absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, parol evidence 
cannot be received to prove that a deed, absolute on 
its face, was given in trust for the benefit of the 
grantor.' " 
In the Arizona case of Wright v. Young 176 P. 584, 
the plaintiffs alleged that the mother of plaintiffs and of Mary 
S. Wright died March 31, 1908, intestate, seized of certain 
lands; that the plaintiffs and Mary S. Wright were and now 
are the sole heirs of their mother; that Mary S. Wright married 
the defendant on November 20, 1911; that on April 18, 1908, 
they deeded their interest in the property to Mary S. Wright, 
it being mutually agreed that she would accept, take and hold 
the title to the property for the purpose of making a sale; 
that she could occupy, keep in repair, and pay the taxes on the 
property, and that as soon as the premises were sold, the 
proceeds were to be divided among the plaintiffs; that she 
died April 4, 1915, and her husband, the defendant, refuses 
to carry out the terms of the agreement. The husband raised 
the statute of frauds by demurrer. The Court said: 
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"There are decisions to the contrary, but we think the 
better rule is that where the deed is absolute upon its 
face, as in the instant case, and where the pleadings 
and the evidence both show an express trust, and where 
there is no allegation of facts in the complaint showing 
fraud, duress, or undue influence, the grantor ought 
not to be allowed by parol evidence to ingraft upon 
his own deed a trust in his o~n favor as against the 
terms of his own deed. The stability of titles rests 
largely upon written instruments, and to protect titles 
this rule in reason ought to prevail. 
" * * * The pleadings in plaintiffs' amended complaint 
contain no allegations of fact showing fraud, misrep-
resentations, concealments, undue influence, duress, or 
that any undue advantage was taken of the plaintiffs by 
reason of weakness or necessities which would render 
the taking of the property by the said Mary S. Wright 
unconscientious. The pleadings wholly fail to show 
a constructive trust; but, on the contrary, they show 
an express trust, and the evidence establishes an express 
trust. When the pleadings and the evidence both show 
an express trust, the grantor in a deed duly executed 
and delivered cannot impress or ingraft by parol a 
trust in his favor against the terms of his own deed." 
The decisions of this Court, we believe are in line with 
the foregoing authorities. For in the case of Chadwick v. 
Arnold, 34 Utah 48, 95P. 527, in an opinion by Justice Straup, 
laid down the rule that a constructive trust only arises by means 
of an intentional false or fraudulent verbal promise to hold 
property for a certain purpose. The Court quoted Sec. 1056 
3 Porn. Eq. Jur. (3rd edition) as follows: 
"The foregoing cases should be carefully distinguished 
from those in which there is a mere verbal promise 
:tru 
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to purchase and convey land. In order that the doc-
trin of trusts ex maleficio with respect to land may 
be enforced under any circumstances, there must be 
something more than a mere verbal promise, however 
unequivocal. otherwise the statute of frauds would be 
virtually abrogated; there must be an element of positive 
fraud accompanying the promise, and by means of 
which the acquisition of the legal title is wrongfully 
consummated. Equity does not pretend to enforce 
verbal promises in the face of the statute; it endeavors 
to prevent and punish fraud by taking from the wrong-
doer the fruits of his deceit, and it accomplishes this 
object by its beneficial and far-reaching doctrine of 
constructive trusts.'· 
And we do not find any subsequent case which varies 
the rule. The case of Jeppson v. Erdmann, 209 P. 203, does 
not, as the decision is only authority for the proposition that 
the mere wish by the grantor that the grantee would make 
certain disposition of the property, did not establish a con-
structive trust. Furthermore, it does not appear that the case 
of Hansen v. Hansen, 171 P. 2, 392 varies the rule announced 
in the case of Chadwick v. Arnold, supra, as it appears to be 
only authority for the rule that the mere expression of an 
intention to create a trust, and the contemplation that some-
thing more is to be done, such does not create a trust! It 
would thus seem that these cases are further authority for 
the proposition that the plaintiffs did not state a cause of 
action, for there is .no allegation whatsover that the grantee 
made any intentional fraudulent promise or any other promise 
to the grantor as a condition for the conveyance. 
It is true that an early Utah case of Haite v. Pearson, 
39 P. 497 held that a mere breach of promise would raise a 
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constructive trust. However, we find no fault with this and 
Chadwick v. Arnold, supra, did not depart from it, as in that 
case there existed a confidential relationship of attorney and 
client, and it was this relationship that layed the foundation 
for the rule that breach of promise was sufficient fraud to 
raise a constructive trust. 
In this respect it should again be noted that plaintiff did 
not allege in any manner, whatsoever, that the grantee secured 
conveyance of the property upon an intentional false promise. 
In fact, there is no allegation that grantee made any promise 
to grantor as a condition to the conveyance of the property 
to her. There is no allegation of fact showing a confidential 
relationship. 
That the foregoing is the better rule and is the weight 
of authority in this country see Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, 
Vol 3, Section 495 and 496. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE INTRO-
DUCTION OF ANY PAROL TESTIMONY AS THE 
PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION IS BASED ON AN 
ALLEGED ORAL TRUST. 
It is the defendant's 2nd contention, Assignment of 
Error No. 2, that the court erred in admitting over defendant's 
objection and in the face of his affirmative defense of the 
statute of frauds any parol testimony tending to establish an 
express oral trust, as the complaint on its face as previously 
argued under Assignment of Error No. 1 alleged an express ·~I 
ttn 
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oral trust and failed to allege any facts whatsoever establishing 
a constructive trust. 
The only evidence regarding the circumstances surround-
ing the creation of the conveyance and the delivery of the 
deed were oral. No instruments in writing were offered or 
received, signed by either grantor or grantee tending in any 
degree to create a trust. 
The court had before it for consideration 33-5-1 and 33-5-3 
U. C. A. 1943, supra, for consideration. 
The rule applicable here is set forth in JONES ON EVI-
DENCE-CIVIL CASES, FOURTH EDITION, Vol. 2, § 418, 
page 789, as follows: 
"By the seventh and eighth sections of the English 
statute of frauds, it is provided that declarations or 
creations of trusts or confidences in lands shall be 
manifested and proved by some writing signed by the 
party who is by law enabled to declare such trust, or 
by his last will in writing; otherwise they shall be 
void. The exception is made, however, as to trusts or 
confidences resulting by the implication or construction 
of law. In substance at least this provision has been 
carried into the statutes of many of the states. Where 
this is the case, the statute operates to prevent the 
enforcement of an express trust which purports to 
have been created in respect of real property by parol." 
Thus there is no competent evidence to sustain plaintiff's 
cause of action, and all of plaintiff's testimony should have 
been excluded. 
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THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING OVER DE-
FENDANT'S OBJECTION PLAINTIFFS' WITNESSES TO 
TESTIFY AS TO SELF-SERVING DECLARATIONS OF 
THE GRANTOR AFTER THE EXECUTION AND DELIV-
ERY OF THE DEED. 
The 3rd contention we wish to urge for the court's con-
sideration is presented by defendant's assignment of error 
3 and 4. It is this that the court erred in permitting plaintiffs' 
witnesses, A. A. Savage and Nora Nielsen to testify regarding 
purported statements of the grantor in disparagement of the 
title conveyed since the self -serving declarations were made 
after the execution and delivery of the deed and were inad-
missible. The deed was delivered December 2, 1933, and the 
purported declarations were supposed to have been made in 
1935. 
The witness, A. A. Savage testified: 
A. "And I asked her if we should send this-have a tax 
notice sent to Amber and she said, 'No, send it here,' 
says, 'I transferred the property to Amber, thought she 
might best take care of it--divide it up when I died.' " 
(TR. 73). 
The witness, Nora Nielsen, testified: 
A. Well, she says: "Vera," she says, "I am going to 
fix my property so that Amber will take care of it. And 
when I pass away I want her to keep the old home for 
the children that they will have a gathering place to 
come;" and she says, "I know that Amber will do that 
because she is fair and just." And by the way, at that 
time she was the only single member of the family.'' 
' I 
] 
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Admission of this evidence was tn error for a grantor 
cannot, after she has conveyed title to the property, make 
statements in disparagement of the title. The editor of 
AMERICAN LAW REPORTS, 156 A.L.R. 1335 in an anno-
tation sets forth the rule as follows: 
"It is a well-established rule of evidence that the dec-
larations of a person under whom title is claimed are 
receivable against the successor so claiming, on the 
theory that there is sufficient identity of interest to 
render the statements of the former equally receivable 
with the admissions of the present owner, and that the 
rights of the latter are those· and only those, of the 
former. 
There is, however, a limitation to this rule as regards 
the time when the declaration is made. Declarations 
of the grantor made after he has conveyed his interest 
in the property cannot, as a rule, be admitted in evidence 
against his successor as an ~admission binding on the 
latter. After the grantor has executed and delivered 
a deed absolute on its face, his declarations reflecting 
on the title of his successor are, as far as the rules of 
evidence are concerned, in no way different from dec-
larations made by third persons, and, hence, are not 
admissible against the grantee." 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PLAIN-
TIFFS, HERMOINE ROSE AND LUCINDA BALLAM, TO 
TESTIFY OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION AS TO 
CONVERSATIONS REGARDING THE TRANSACTION 
IN DISPUTE WITH THE DECEASED GRANTEE. 
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The defendant's 4th contention is that the court erred, 
Assignments of Error 5 and 6, in permitting over defendant's 
objection, Hermoine Rose and Lucinda Ballam, both plaintiffs, 
to testify to conversations purported. to have taken place between 
them and the deceased grantee regarding the transaction in 
dispute. The declared conversations were equally within the 
knowledge of the witnesses and the deceased grantee. The 
defendant's title vested in him as an heir of the grantee it 
was distributed to him in probate. He did not claim it in his 
own right but as an heir of the grantee. In this action is thus 
an attempt to assail and reduce the estate from which the 
defendant derived his title to the property in question. The 
basis of the defendant's title is the integrity of the grantee's 
estate from which it was derived. Thus these witnesses were 
incompetent to testify. Hermoine Rose's testimony regarding 
their purported conversations was as follows: 
A. "Well, Amber was very sick at the time and my 
sister, Mrs. Ballam and her husband and my daughter-
in-law, Arlene Rose, and J\1r. ] ens en was there and she 
was crying. It was just a day or two before they had 
to leave to return to Hyrum or for Utah and she said 
they hoped to come back, and my sister asked her why 
she didn't sell the old place. We would give her our 
permission, and there would be-and it would be all-
right with us. She could sell it and come down there 
so we could all be together and she said, ''No, she 
would not sell the home." Mother's wish was that it 
was so that there would be a home there for someone. 
At that time Mr. Jensen said they did not care to sell, 
and she told him it was not any of his affair." (Tr. 
130, 240-142). 
Lu 
And 
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Lucinda H. BaHam's testimony regarding their p~rporteJ 
conversation was as follows: 
A. She said the place was her home. We should all 
feel free to come home any time we wanted to, that 
it was ours as much as hers,· and any of our children 
would be welcome there. When we got through with 
it, if she ever sold it, why~ the intention was that we 
should have our share--. 
And Mrs. BaHam again said: 
A. Only that Mrs. Rose here--we were all talking he!~e. 
\Y/ e were sitting in the front room and Mr. and },f rs. 
Rose and Mr. Jensen and Amber and I were there, and 
she was not feeling a bit well and she was crying. She 
said she hated to go back to Hyrum. "Why don't you 
sell out and come back here and have a home. \Ve 
would like to be together." We had been separated 
so much. She said, "I will never sell the place because 
mother wanted it for all the children and that's the 
way it's going to stay." At that time Mr. Jensen said 
something about wanting to sell it and she said, "You 
keep still. This is nothing to do with you. You won't 
get anything out of it." 
The court has before it sub-paragraph (3) 104-49-2 U.C.A. 
1943, which reads as follows: 
( 3) A party to any civil action, suit or proceeding, and 
any person directly interested in the event thereof, and 
any person from, through or under whom such party 
or interested person derives his interest or title or 
any part thereof, when the adverse party in such action, 
suit or proceeding claims or opposes, sues or defends, 
as guardian of an insane or incompetent person, or as 
the executor or administrator, heir, legatee or devisee 
of any deceased person, or as guardian, assignee or 
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grantee, directly or remotely, of such heir, legatee or 
devisee, as to any statement by, or transaction with, 
such deceased, insane or incompetent person, or matter 
of fact whatever; which must have been equally within 
the knowledge of both the witness and such insane, 
incompetent person, unless such witness is called to 
testify thereto by such adverse party so claiming or 
opposing, suing or defending, in such action, suit or 
proceeding. 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in the case of Johnson 
v. Omaha Loan and Building Ass'n. 257 N. W. 370 held that 
where a party is called upon to defend what he obtained from 
a deceased person by inheritance he represents the deceased 
person within the statute regarding competency of witnesses 
and that the plaintiff in such action cannot testify. The court 
said: 
Section 20-1202, Comp. St. 1929, reads as follows: 
"No person having a direct legal interest in the result 
of any civil action or proceeding, when the adverse 
party is the representative of a deceased person, shall 
be permitted to testify to any transaction or conversa-
tion had behveen the deceased person and the witness." 
The situations in which this statute applies and wherein 
a litigant or witness may be said to be "the represen-
tative of a deceased person," as contemplated by this 
statute, have been the subject of much controversy, 
but are quite well settled by the decisions of this 
court. It is not necessary that the personale rpresentative 
of the deceased in the sense of being the administrator 
or executor of the estate be a party. The rule is stated 
in McCoy v. Conrad, 64 Neb. 150, 89 N.W. 665, 667, 
and cited with approval in McEntarffer v. Payne, 107 
Neb. 168, 185 N.W. 329, in thislanguage: "If a party 
is so placed in a litigation that he is called upon to 
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defend that which he has obtained from a deceased 
person, and make the defense which the deceased might 
have made if living * * * then he may be said, in 
that litigation, to represent a deceased person." These 
principles apply to the present case and we conclude 
that the evidence of the plaintiff in regard to the pur-
ported delivery of the passbook was inadmissible. 
It would thus appear that the court committed prejudicial 
error in admitting in evidence this testimony. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE 
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE GRANTEE TOOK THE 
PROPERTY FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF THE 
GRANTOR'S HEIRS, AND IN ANY EVENT, IT IS A 
TRANSACTION WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
AND VOID. 
It is the defendant's fifth contention, (Assignment of 
Erros Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 16) that there is no 
evidence to sustain the Court's findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and decree, to the effect that the grantee took the deed 
subject. to any conditions, with an agreement to hold for the 
benefit of the plaintiffs and that the conveyance was for the 
purpose of avoiding probate. 
Although it is true that some of plaintiff's witnesses 
testified that the grantor prior to the delivery of the deed on 
the 2nd day of August, 1933, (Tr. 149 and 150) told them that 
she had, or was going to, deed the property to the grantee, so 
that her daughter on her death could divide it among her 
heirs, not witnesses testified that she said that the grantee had 
promised or agreed to do so. 
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At the time of the execution of the deed in 1927 
the grantee was living in Los Angeles, California, . and had 
been for eight years, and at the date of its delivery six years 
later, she was still living there. The deed was delivered at the 
instance of the grantor, she having it recorded. One of the 
plaintiffs, Lucinda Ballam, at her mother's request, placed 
the deed in the Recorder's Office, Cache County, Utah, for 
recording, and her testimony regarding this transaction is as 
follows: 
Q. Where was Amber at the time? 
A. In California. 
Q. How long had she been there? 
A. She had been living in California about seventeen 
or eighteen years. 
Q. And who was it handed you this deed? 
A. My mother. She came .out and said, "Lucinda, 
I'd like you to take this over and have it recorded." 
Q. Did you do that? 
A. Yes. * * * Yes, that was in 1933. 
Q. Then did you have any talks with your mother 
at that time about this deed? 
A. Yes, she said the day she was having it recorded 
in Amber's name, as she had said before, she did 
not want us to have our feelings hurt because she 
wanted to be fair with all of us, and she said 
the home would always be there for us if any of 
us wanted to come back, that we were welcome 
and that after her death it should be divided 
equally among all of us, and she was not leaving 
it for Amber. It was for all the family. (Tr. 149-
150) 
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and testified as follows: 
A. Yes, she said she had them fix it in Amber's 
name because she was single. All the rest of the 
family \Yere married and she felt certain that 
Amber would keep the property there for a place 
for any of the children to use if they wanted 
to come home for any reason, and if it was de-
cided that the property should be disposed of 
after her death that she knew that Amber would 
make a fair distribution to all the children. (Tr. 
114) 
In this respect there is some confusion in the record 
whether this conversation took place in 1929 or 1933. How-
ever, it probably took place in 1933. 
This is the only evidence in the record concerning the 
statement made by the grantor at the time of the delivery of 
the deed, and if it establishes anything, it i_s this, that the 
grantee did not induce her mother to convey the property 
to her, not did she make any agreement or give a promise as 
a condition to the conveyance. Her mother did not say that 
Amber had so promised. It negatives any such proposition. 
Mrs. Ballam testified as to purported statements made 
by the grantor in the year 1927 and the foregoing statement 
of her husband, W. P. BaHam was either made in 1929 or 1927. 
Yet in neither of these conversations did witnesses testify that 
the grantor said that Amber had agreed or promised to hold 
the property for the grantee's benefit. They were statements 
of a wish only. (Tr. 114-116 and 149.) 
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Three other of plaintiffs' witnesses also testified regard-
ing statements made by the grantor prior to the delivery of the 
deed. They positively said in the years 1925 or 1926, 1927, 
1930 and 1932. Plaintiffs' witnesses were always positive of 
the date, no matter how many years had gone by. An analysis 
of these witnesses' testimony will also reveal that the grantor 
never told them that Amber had induced her mother, by 
promise or otherwise, to convey the property .to her, or that 
she would make any disposition of the property as a condition 
of its conveyance. (Tr. 51, 71, 91, and 92) 
The record is silent as to any purported statement made 
by the grantee regarding the conveyance until 1934, and both 
grantor and grantee were supposed to be present when, accord-
ing to the witness, W. P. Ballam, she made the following 
statement: 
A. Well, the discussion was to the effect that the 
property had been left and recorded in Amber's 
name here, and that Ma (meaning Mrs. Haws) 
has been left-wanted the property to be left 
there in case any of the children ever would want 
to come back and use the place for vacation 
quarters or for a home. 
Q. And what did Amber say? 
A. She said, "Well, that's the way it's going to be 
left." (Tr. 115) 
Now, certainly, these conversations do not create a trust 
for they are nothing more than an expression of a wish, a 
wish as to an indefinite something, and a wish, no matter how 
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definite, does not create a trust. It is said here that Amber 
was to hold for the plaintiffs for their benefit for distribution 
upon her mother's death. Jensen vs. Howell, 282 P. 1034, 95 
Utah 64; Jeppson vs. Erdmann, 209 P. 203, 60 Utah 543. 
Furthermore, this statement negatives any promise or agree-
ment made by the grantee prior to the delivery of the deed 
that conditions were imposed. This statement, taken at its 
face value, does not relate to any prior understanding or agree-
ment. It negatives any such proposition and certainly it is 
the law that a promise made after the acquisition of title does 
not create a trust. 65 C. J., page 457, says: 
FRAUD AT INCEPTION OF TITLE. In order that 
fraud may give rise to a constructive trust, it must 
exist at the inception of title to the property, or inhere 
in the transaction by which the trustee acquires the 
title, and fraudulent acts or omissions subsequent to 
the acquisition of title and not connected therewith do 
not give rise to a constructive trust. So a constructive 
trust ordinarily cannot grow out of the mere violation 
of a declaration or agreement of trust, whether implied 
or express, written or verbal, nor from a violation of 
or refusal to perform a promise to or agreement with 
the person seeking to establish the trust to convey 
property to him, nor from mere failure to pay the 
purchase money, for property conveyed, although where. 
the circumstances are such that a constructive trust 
would arise in the absence of any agreement, the exist-
ence of such an agreement will not prevent a trust 
arising. Likewise, a denial that any trust exists, or a 
resort to the Statute of Frauds to defeat the enforce-
ment of a parol trust or obligation, is not such a fraud 
as to give rise to a constructive trust. 
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As to the other subsequent statements of either the grantor 
or the grantee, none of them in any way should be construed 
as establishing an agreement at the time the conveyance was 
made. At the most they merely indicate the promise to carry 
out the mother's indefinite wish and this a promise made sub-
sequent to the conveyance. (Tr. 51, 52, 67, 80, 81, 117, 130, 
131, 142, 151, 152, 156) 
Again in this respect we are setting out two conversations 
purported to have taken place after the conveyance. In one 
instance, both the grantor and grantee were present, and in 
the other, the grantee was to have made a statement after 
the grantor's death. 
Mrs. Laura Garner testified that some time between 1937 
and 1939 she was presen~ at a conversation in which the grantor 
and grantee took part. 
A. Well, we were talking about what Amber was 
going to do with the home after they knew her 
mother could not live. And she said, "I have 
not decided whether to sell it and divide it or to 
go back to California and live there for some time, 
for a while. (Tr. 66 and 67) 
This conversation indicates definitely that the property 
was conveyed to the grantee as her own to do with as she 
wished. Her mother imposed no conditions, made no request 
and took no exception to what she said. This negatives a 
trust. In line with this conversation, shortly after her mother's 
death, while in California she was supposed to have made, 
according to the witness W. P. Ballam, the following state-
ment: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
45 
A. I heard her mention several times any time we 
wanted to come home and spend a little time or 
vacation, or for any other emergency, we wanted 
to move in there, she said, "There is alwavs room 
for any of us and all of us." She said, · .. That's 
the way Ma wanted it to be left and that's the 
way I intend to have it." (Tr. 117) 
These testimonies from plaintiffs' witnesses unquestionably 
establish that it was given to the grantee without any strings 
attached and that she was merely intended to follow out her 
mother's wish that her brothers and sisters would always be 
welcome in the home. 
Now then, where is there any fraud in this case? Even 
assuming that there was a promise, there is no evidence of an 
intentionally false or fraudulent one. There is no fraud in 
the inception of this conveyance. 
In any event, plaintiffs' cause of action, both their plead-
ings and evidence, are within the Statute of Frauds and the 
transaction was void. To hold otherwise would virtually abro-
gate the statute, for, as this Court said in Chadwick v. Arnold, 
95 P. 527, 34 Utah 48, supra: 
" * * * The foregoing case should be clearly dis-
tinguished from those in which there is a mere verbal 
promise to purchase and convey land. In order that 
the doctrine of trusts ex maleficio with respect to land 
may be enforced under any circumstances, there must 
be something more than a mere verbal promise, how-
ever unequivocable, otherwise the statute of frauds 
would be virtually abrogated; there must be an element 
of positive fraud accompanying the promise, and by 
means of which the acquisition of the legal title is 
wrongfully consummated.'' 
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THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE BY A PRE-
PONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND BY CLEAR, 
CERTAIN, DEFINITE, UNEQUIVOCAL AND CONCLU-
SIVE EVIDENCE THAT THE GRANTEE TOOK THE 
DEED SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS. 
It is defendant's sixth contention, Assignments of Errors 
Nos. 7, 8,·-9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, that plaintiffs' proof falls short 
even assuming that their cause of action and evidence is not 
within the Statute of Frauds to establish a constructive trust. 
Regarding the quantum of proof necessary to establish 
a constructive trust this court in the case of Hansen v. Hansen, 
171 P. 2nd 382, in an opinion by Justice :McDonough, said: 
In all such cases the court will scrutinize parol evidence 
with great caution, and the plaintiff must fail unless 
it is clear, definite, unequivocal, and conclusive. Public 
policy, and the safety and security of titles to real 
estate, demand this rule, because such evidence is 
offered to overcome the strong presumption, arising 
from the terms and conditions of an instrument in 
writing, which is always the best evidence of title. 
If it were once established that the effect of the terms 
of a written instrument could be avoided by a bare 
preponderance of parol evidence, the gates to perjury 
would soon be wide open, and no person could longer 
rest in the security of his title to property, however 
solemn might be the instrument on which it was 
founded. ' * * * To make such an effort success-
ful, the law, for the safety of titles, requires that the 
proof shall be of the most convincing and satisfactory 
kind. Nothing short of certain, definite, reliable, and 
convincing proof will justify t~e court of divesting 
one man of title to lands, evidenced by a regular deed, 
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and putting it in another.' l\1idmer v. MiJner's Ex· rs; 
26 N. J. Eq. 299. 
As previously pointed out this action was brought 20 years 
after the deed was executed, 14 years after its delivery, 9 years 
after the grantor's death and 2 years after grantee's death. 
There is a direct conflict in the evidence as to what the 
intent of the grantor was in conveying the property to the 
grantee. In this respect even the plaintiffs' witnesses asserted 
two different theories. The first theory being that the grantor 
conveyed the property for the purpose of avoiding probate 
and that the grantee was to distribute the property to the 
grantor's heirs on her death, and the other theory was, and this 
was the one pleaded, that she deeded the property so that the 
grantee would keep it as a family home for the grantor's 
children. 
Defendant's evidence, and this was consistent with the 
use to which the property was put, was to the effect that it 
was deeded to the grantee as her sole and separate property, 
not subject to any conditions whatsoever. The grantee was 
the oldest in a family of six. She was unmarried at the time 
of conveyance, she was 39 years of age and had worked all 
of her adult life, helping her mother and family financially 
• over the years, and when her mother became so ill that she 
needed care in 193 7 the grantee quit her employment in Cali-
fornia and returned to Utah to take care of her mother. 
In line with the grantee's help over the years, Mr. Conway 
Lewis, a nephew, said the grantor asserted that she had given 
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the property to her daughter, Amber, because of her help and 
financial assistance over the years. In regard to this, he testified: 
Q. Did you ever have any conversation with Mrs 
Haws (that's .Maria Haws) with respect to that 
property? 
A. Well the only conversation I had with her was 
that she had given it to Amber because Amber 
had done so much for her, that she had sent her 
money when she was in California and had come 
home and taken care of her and that she had given 
the property to Amber * * * 
A. Well that would be hard for me to say exactly 
what - when it was because - that's all I know 
she told me she had given the home to Amber and 
it was the understanding that it was hers. (Tr. 
161, 162) 
This conversation was after Amber had returned home 
to take care of her mother. 
Mrs. Joyce Lewis, the wife of Conway Lewis, also testified: 
A. At one time we were just joking and we were 
talking about deeds and different people leaving 
their estates. She just said to me she just hoped 
things would be fixed up the way she would like 
them to be. 
Q. How did she say they were? 
A. She said she thought Amber, her daughter, really 
should have the place because she had been so good 
to her. She said she had given her clothes and 
sent her money to come home and taken care 
of her when she was sick and she said, "She's 
been one of the very best girls I've known in 
my life." 
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Q. How long was that before she died? 
.:\. Five or six years. (Tr. 167, 168) 
And lvir. Raymond Nielsen, who lived in Hyrum and 
was a friend of the family, said: 
Q. * * * did Mrs. Haws ever talk to you in any 
way about her property? 
A. Yes, she just said that Amber was going to get 
the place * * * . 
A. Well it was before Amber came up to live. I don't 
know just what year it was. (Tr. 165) 
Mrs. Beda Petersen, a neighbor of Mrs. Haws and the 
grantee testified that after her marriage that Amber told her 
that, "Well, she stated the home was hers and that she intended 
to build a home on the south side." (Tr. 173) 
In line with these declarations that the grantor deeded 
the property to the grantee, the grantee upon her mother's death 
on March 24, 1939, went into exclusive possession of the 
property. Upon her marriage to the defendant it became 
their home and they held it out to the world as such. They 
lived in it until her death, March 16, 1945, nearly 7 years, and 
during this period none of the plaintiffs ever asserted any rights 
in the property. And had the grantee lived they undoubtedly 
would still be occupying it. Not only did they occupy the prop-
erty but they improved it as hereinbefore mentioned. The use was 
in line with unconditional ownership. (Tr. 63, 64, 173, 174, 
183, 185, 210, 216) 
It is difficult to understand plaintiffs' position that they 
claimed any interest in the property and that it was deeded by 
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their mother to their sister in order to avoid probate in view 
of the fact that they permitted her together with her husband 
to occupy it for 7 years without asserting any interest therein. 
Acquiescence in this occupation was not consistent with the 
position they took when they formed a delegation and called 
on the defendant two or three days after his wife's funeral 
to make demands on him that he turn the property over to them. 
Although they said the property was theirs they never stated 
that their mother had conveyed the property to Amber for 
the purpose of avoiding probate and that she had promised 
her mother to divide it with them. (Tr. 120, 121, 127, 132, 
138, 142, 143) 
That Amber had been of great help to her family from 
the time she started working as an adult is apparent, not only 
from the testimony of the defendant's witnesses but from the 
plaintiffs' also, and this is further indicated by the fact that 
she paid the funeral expenses of Noble Haws, the father of 
the plaintiffs in 1941. Although one of the plaintiffs testified 
that the money for the paying of the funeral expenses of the 
brother came from money her mother had saved, it would 
appear that such is most unlikely for during these years she 
was being taken care of by the Welfare Department. As a 
matter of fact, the Welfare Department paid $75.00 towards 
her own burial. (Tr. 161, 167, 168, 171, 199, 201; Exhibit 6) 
These facts alone would indicate that the conveyance of 
this property to her daughter, Amber, was without any con-
ditions whatsoever and entirely in line with the testimony as 
given by defendant's witnesses, to the effect that the grantee's 
mother had given her the property. 
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Another outstanding piece of evidence in this case that 
makes it definitely appear that the property was given to 
the grantee without any conditions being attached: That is in 
1935 the property was sold to Cache County for failure to pay 
the taxes assessed thereon, pursuant to which the grantor wrote 
to the grantee telling her that the property was being taken 
over by the county, that if she didn't send her $100.00 to pay 
the taxes that it would be sold. She sent the money for this 
purpose, and the county, on its payment, conveyed the property 
back to the grantee, by quitclaim deed on the 29th of !viay, 
1936. (Tr. 182, 183; Exhibit 2, entry 16) 
Garland Haws, one of the plaintiffs, testified that he 
handled this transaction with the county. In this respect he 
testified: 
Q. Who paid that $100.00? 
A. I paid it. 
Q. Did you receive any part of it from Amber Haws 
Jensen? 
A. I don't remember as I did. I wouldn't be sure 
but I don't remember. (Tr. 253) 
This is not a denial of the defendant's testimony that 
the grantee sent the $100.00. If anything, it is an admission. 
If Garland Haws had paid the money himself he would have 
remembered it. This was in a day when $100.00 had some 
purchasing power. 
Another surprising thing about this case is that the plain-
tiffs, Hermoine Rose and Lucinda Ballam, until after the 
death of their sister were residents of California, and yet it 
was from these witnesses and their husbands that came all of 
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the testimony of the plaintiffs themselves regarding. purported 
conversations with their mother and Amber, the grantee, about 
this transaction. None of the evidence regarding the conveyance 
came. from their brother, Garland Haws, who lived in the 
same town as his mother, an~ his sister, the grantee, after she 
had returned to care for her mother. Yet he did not testify 
regarding any conversation with either grantee or grantor, 
whatsoever. You can search his testimony from one end to t~e 
other and you will not find any testimony by him· regarding the 
transaction in question. It is indeed strange that neither his 
mother nor sister discussed with him the particulars of this 
conveyance. Especially is this true in view of the fact that h~ 
handled the transaction wherein, in effect, he redeemed the 
property in question for his sister, the grantee. Certainly he 
must have asked his mother why the property had been ·~on­
veyed to his sister. His silence must speak that any answer 
would have been fatal to his cause. (Tr. 135-140, 252, 256) 
IF THERE WAS A TRUST THE COURT ERRED IN 
ORDERING THE DEFENDANT TO CONVEY ALL OF 
HIS RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 
TO A TRUSTEE BECAUSE AS AN HEIR TO THE GRAN-· 
TEE HE IS ENTITLED TO A ONE-SIXTH INTEREST 
IN THE PROPERTY. 
It is the defendant's seventh contention, Assignments of 
Error No. 11, 12 and 14, that the findings of fact are so un-
certain and indefinite that it cannot be determined what trust, 
if any, was created by the actions of the parties and what 
interest, if any, the plaintiffs and the defendant have in the 
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property m question. In the first instance, the court found 
that the grantee took the property for the use and benefit of 
the heirs of the grantor on her death; however, it failed to 
find the respective interests the heirs were entitled to. It then 
found that the purpose of the conveyance was to avoid probate. 
In line with these findings it entered its conclusions of law 
and decree appointing a trustee and ordering the defendant 
to deed to the trustee all of his right, title and interest in the 
property. (Tr. 26-30) 
It would thus appear that the court, although it found the 
purpose of the trust was to avoid probate. it nevertheless finds 
and decrees that the only heirs who had any interest in the 
property were the heirs of the grantor and that any interest the 
defendant might have had as an heir of the grantee was fore-
closed, else why did the court require him to deed all of his 
interest in the property to a trustee? This is contrary to the 
law and the facts. 
The interest of the various parties in the property should 
be determined in this action. Another one for this purpose 
should not be necessary. If the grantee held this property in 
trust for her mother's heirs for distribution on the grantor's 
death, then as a grantee, being her mother's heir she would be 
entitled to one-sixth interest therein, and this interest has now 
passed to the defendant. Under any theory of the case he 
is entitled to have the court decree that he has a one-sixth 
interest in the property and the court unquestionably erred in 
ordering that he convey all of his right, title and interest in the 
property to a trustee. 
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IF A TRUST EXISTED IT WAS REPUDIATED BY 
THE GRANTEE MORE THAN THREE YEARS PRIOR 
TO COMMENCEMENT OF THIS ACTION, AND THE 
CAUSE OF ACTION, IF ANY, WAS BARRED BY SUB-
SECTION 3, 104-2-24 U.C.A. 1943. 
It is the defendant's eighth contention, Assignment of 
Error No. 15, that plaintiffs' cause of action, if any, is barred 
by the Statute of Limitations, sub-section 3, 104-2-24 U.C.A. 
1943. It is as follows: 
( 3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud 
or mistake; but the cause of action in such case shall not 
be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the 
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or 
mistake. 
The undisputed evidence in this case established that the 
grantee, upon her mother's death, March 24, 1939, and there-
after until the grantee's death, 1\1arch 16, 1945, exercised ex-
clusive possession of the property, paid the taxes, held it out 
to the world as her home and in the years 1940 and 1941 made 
various improvements in line with ownership of which plaintiffs 
had notice. (Tr. 63, 64, 173, 174, 183, 185, 210, 212) 
The cause of action in question, if any, is one sounding in 
fraud - fraud in the inception - and thus it is controlled by 
subsection 3, 104-2-24 U.C.A. 1943. Such is the effect of 
the Utah case, Davidsen v. Salt Lake City, 81 P. 2nd 375, 118 
A.L.R. 195. In this case the action was commenced to set aside 
a deed on the ground of fraud in its procurement and the court 
held, in an opinion by :Mr. Hoyt, District Judge, that in such 
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case the 3-year Statute of Limitations applied and not the 
statute relating to actions for the recovery of real property. The 
court said: 
But if his relief in each case depends as here upon 
the cancellation of a deed for fraud or mistake, he 
must bring his action within the period provided by 
law for an action based upon that ground. It would 
be extremely mischievous if a person claiming to be 
a victim of fraud or mistake were permitted to delay 
bringing his action until nearly seven years after dis-
covery of the fraud or mistake upon which he relies. 
As to the question of notice this court, in the case of Salt 
Lake City v. Salt Lake Investment Co., 134 P. 603, 43 Utah 181, 
said: 
In Shain v. Sresovich, 104 Cal. at page 405, 38 pac. 
at page 52, the Supreme Court of California, in pass-
ing upon the effect of a statute of which the portion 
we have quoted above is an exact transcript, says: 
·'The rule is well established that the means 
of knowledge is equivalent to knowledge, and 
that a party who has the opportunity of knowing 
the facts constituting the fraud of which he com-
plains cannot be supine and inactive, and after-
wards allege a want of knowledge that arose by 
reason of his own laches or negligence." 
As to the question of notice, also see the Utah case of 
Gibson v. Jensen, 158 P. 426, 48 Utah 244; Smith v. Edwards, 
17 P. 2nd 264, 81 Utah 244. 
And as to when the Statute of Limitations begins to run 
in such an action, the Supreme Court of Arizona, in the case 
of Jack Waite Mining Co. v. West, 101 P. 2nd 202, said: 
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(1-3) We consider this last contention of defendant 
first, for if it be correct and applicable to the facts, 
there is no need for us to go further. We think it is 
the law that where the trustee of an express trust, to 
the knowledge of his cestui que trust, repudiates the 
trust and converts the property, the statute then begins 
to run. Nor do we understand that plaintiff questions 
this. We also think the better reasoning is that even 
though plaintiff may not have notice of the specific 
repudiation of the trust, yet if he knows facts from 
which a reasonable man would be put on notice that 
the trust has been, or is about to be, repudiated, this 
is equivalent to actual notice of the repudiation. A 
cestui que trust should not be permitted to shut his 
eyes and refuse to recognize a plain warning of danger, 
and then claim that he had no knowledge of the catas-
trophe when it comes. Weniger v. Success Mining Co., 
8 cir., 227 F. 548. 
And to the same effect is the Supreme Court of Montana 
in the case of State ex rel. Central Auxiliary Corporation v. 
Rorabeck, County Treasurer of Golden Valley County, et a!. 
(Phillips Inv. Co. et al., Interveners), 108 P 2nd 601. 
The court said: 
( 5, 6) It is generally held that as between the trustee 
and the beneficiary of a trust, the statute of limitations 
does not run until the trust has been repudiated and 
notice of repudiation received by the beneficiary. Black-
ford v. City of Libby, supra; City of New Orleans v. 
Warner, 175 U.S. 120, 30 S. Ct. 44, 44 L. Ed. 96. The 
rule is succinctly stated in 4 Bogert on Trusts and 
Trustees, pag 951, as follows: 
"The true rule with respect to the statute of limita-
tions and express trusts is more clearly stated as fol-
lows: During performa:,nce of the express trust there 
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is no cause of action for breach and so the statute 
of limitations has no bearing on the rights of the cestui; 
but, if the trustee violates the trust and the cestui 
knows of such conduct, or could have learned of it by 
the use of reasonable diligence, the court will apply 
the statute of limitations which governs equitable 
causes of action or an analagous statute concerning 
legal causes of action. To cause the statute to begin 
running during the life of the trust there must be 
some act of repudiation of the trust by the trustee, as 
where he declines to account to the cestui, takes trust 
income for his own purposes, or sets himself up as the 
owner of the trust capital." 
Also see Mayse v. Mineola Co-op Exchange, 30 P. 2nd 
120. 
From the facts in this case it undoubtedly appears that 
if the grantee fraudulently procured the conveyance of this 
property upon a promise to hold it for the use and benefit 
of the plaintiffs, for the purpose of distribution upon her 
mother's death in order to prevent probate, that her use of 
the property for 7 years thereafter in a manner as indicated 
would certainly be notice to the adverse parties. If it was the 
agreement distribution should have been made on her mother's 
~ death, or within a reasonable time thereafter, and a party under 
' such circumstances goes into possession, occupies the property, 
and holds property out to the world as hers and her husband's 
, and makes improvements thereon, certainly the adverse parties 
have notice of a breach of trust. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we desire merely briefly to say that the 
evidence in this case not only fails to establish a trust but that 
the plaintiffs have failed to establish by clear, definite, un-
equi~ocal and conclusive proof that Amber Haws received 
this property from her mother subject to any conditions what-
soever. In any event we believe that the security of titles and 
the equities of this case demand that the decree of the district 
court be set aside and that the court find the property 
vested in the defendant free and clear of all encumbrances 
and not subject to any demands or claims of the plaintiffs 
whatsoever. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEWEL G. DAINES 
L. DELOS DAINES 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorney.r for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
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